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PROBABLE CAUSE BASED ON
INACCURATE COMPUTER INFORMATION:
TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF NCIC
OPERATING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
I. Introduction
Computer data banks increasingly have been used to supplement
manual files as a means of storing criminal justice information. The
most comprehensive computerized system is the National Crime Infor-
mation Center (NCIC),' established in 1967.2 It is managed by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 3 but functions as a centralized com-
puter bank for use by criminal justice agencies at the federal, state and
local level. 4  Among other functions, the NCIC is used by police
agencies as an investigative tool, assisting in the determination as to
whether an arrest should be executed.5
1. In 1974, the NCIC was accessible to 5,000 criminal justice agencies, housed
approximately 2.5 million records, and handled approximately 60,000 inquiries
daily. De Weese, Reforming Our "Record Prisons:" A Proposal for the Federal
Regulation of Crime Data Banks, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 26, 30 n.20 (1974). Today, the
NCIC is accessible to approximately 60,000 criminal justice agencies. Telephone
conversation with Jeremiah J. Smith, Assistant Section Chief, National Crime Infor-
mation Center (Jan. 7, 1982). By 1981 the NCIC housed approximately 9.2 million
records, NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCIC NEWS-
LETTER 2 (Oct. 1981), and was handling approximately 300,000 transactions daily.
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1982: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 968 (1981) (statement of William Webster).
2. For a discussion of the origin and development of the NCIC, see De Weese,
Reforming Our "Record Prisons:" A Proposal for the Federal Regulation of Crime
Data Banks, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 26 (1974).
3. The FBI manages the NCIC pursuant to authority given to the Attorney
General's Office to "acquire, collect, classify, and preserve" criminal records for the
official use of the federal government, the states, cities and other institutions, under
28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (1976), and delegated by the Attorney General under 28 C.F.R. §
0.85 (1980).
4. NCIC Operating Manual § 1.1, at Intro-1 (May 1, 1981). Examples of the
state agencies comprising the NCIC are New York State Identification and Intelli-
gence System (NYSIIS), California Justice Information System (CJIS), Law Enforce-
ment Information Network (LEIN) (Michigan), Arizona Criminal Information Cen-
ter (ACIC), and Florida Criminal Information Center (FCIC). The NCIC also
includes control terminals at the city and metropolitan area level. See generally
PRojEcT SEARCH, INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION
AND STATISTICS SYSTEMS (1974), which discusses state and regional criminal justice
information systems.
5. The NCIC also is used to store criminal histories and to assist in the location of
missing persons. NCIC Operating Manual § 1.1, at Intro-2. (Nov. 1, 1979).
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The major advantage of computerized criminal information is that
information is accessible to users nationwide.6 Computerized infor-
mation, however, is not necessarily more accurate than manual file
systems, and because computer data bases increase accessibility, the
effect of inaccuracies is magnified. 7 The use of computerized crimi-
nal information has raised important legal questions in cases where an
arrest was made by a police officer relying on computer information
which later proved to have been inaccurate at the time of the arrest.8
If a search incident to an arrest based on unreasonably inaccurate
information yields evidence of criminal activity, the defendant's
fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
has been violated9 and the evidence must be suppressed pursuant to
the exclusionary rule.10
6. G. ZENK, PROJECT SEARCH: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF CRIMINAL INFOR-
MATION IN AMERICA 120 (1979).
7. Id.
8. The following cases invalidated arrests based on inaccurate computer infor-
mation: United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975); People v.
Decuir, 84 Ill. App. 3d 531, 405 N.E.2d 891 (1980); People v. Lemmons, 49 A.D. 2d
639, 370 N.Y.S.2d 243 (3d Dep't 1975) (mem.), aJff'd on other grounds, 40 N.Y.2d
505, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97, 354 N.E.2d 836 (1976); People v. Jones, 110 Misc. 2d 875, 443
N.Y.S.2d 298 (Crim. Ct. 1981). The following cases upheld arrests based on inaccu-
rate computer information: Childress v. United States, 381 A.2d 614 (D.C. 1977);
Patterson v. United States, 301 A.2d 67 (D.C. 1973); State v. Cross, 164 N.J. Super.
368, 396 A.2d 604 (App. Div. 1978); Commonwealth v. Riley, 425 A.2d 813 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1981). There is no published figure as to the extent of inaccurate informa-
tion in the NCIC, but a recent random survey by the FBI Identification Division
showed that a "large percentage" of apprehended fugitives had not been cancelled
from the NCIC. NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
NCIC NEWSLETTER 2 (Sept. 1981).
9. The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation .. " U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amend-
ment does not prohibit all warrantless searches and seizures, but requires that they
not be unreasonable. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925). The ques-
tion of reasonableness depends upon whether the agency making the warrantless
search or seizure has probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, is in
the process of being committed, or is about to be committed. Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959). Probable cause is measured by the facts and
circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer and of which the officer
had reasonably trustworthy information. Id. Where probable cause standards are
met, an arresting officer is entitled to make a full search of the arrestee's person.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973), as well as the area within which
the arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence, Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
10. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 393 (1914).
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This Note discusses the fourth amendment implications of arrest
based on inaccurate computer information and articulates the circum-
stances under which such an arrest should be upheld." NCIC safe-
guards are discussed and it is recommended that the courts take
judicial notice of NCIC operating policies and procedures as a guide
to determining whether probable cause has been established where an
arrest is based on inaccurate computer information.
II. The Elements of Reasonable Action Pursuant
to Inaccurate Computer Information
In Whitely v. Warden,12 the United States Supreme Court set forth
the "fellow officer" rule.13 The Court held that police officers called
upon to aid other officers in the execution of an arrest warrant are
entitled to act on the strength of an official communication with the
other officers, because the acting officers can assume that the commu-
nicating officers satisfied the probable cause requirement of the fourth
amendment.14 The arrest cannot stand, however, if the communicat-
ing officers do not have probable cause to send the communication.15
11. For a discussion of why an NCIC report can constitute probable cause to
arrest, in addition to a discussion of NCIC history and procedures, see Garbage In
Gospel Out: Establishing Probable Cause Through Computerized Criminal Informa-
tion Transmittals, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 509 (1976). For a discussion of due process rights
in regard to computerized criminal history records, see Doernberg and Ziegler, Due
Process Versus Data Processing: An Analysis of Computerized Criminal History
Information Systems, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1110 (1980). See also A Symposium, Com-
puterized Justice Information Systems: A Recognition of Competing Interest, 22
VILL. L. Rev. 1171 (1977); Note, Extradition: Computer Technology and the Need to
Provide Fugitives with Fourth Amendment Protection in Section 1983 Actions, 65
MINN. L. REV. 892 (1981); N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1982, at 25, col. 2.
12. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
13. See W. La Fave, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.5, at 623 (1978).
14. Whitely, 401 U.S. at 568. By holding that an arresting officer is entitled to
act upon a communication with other officers, this probably has the effect of insulat-
ing the arresting officer from civil liability in an action for false arrest if it turns out
that the fellow officers did not have probable cause to send the information. W. LA
FAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.5, at 623-24 (1978). In Blanchfield v. State, 104
Misc. 2d 21, 427 N.Y.S.2d 682 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1980), the claimant was imprisoned
after being stopped by a police officer who had been advised that a computer
printout showed that the claimant's license had been revoked. In fact, the license had
been reinstated some days prior to the arrest. The claimant was incarcerated for
more than a day until the police discovered that the license had been reinstated. Id.
at 22-24, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 684-85. The claimant brought a successful tort action for
false imprisonment, wherein the court ruled that the arresting officer did not have
probable cause to make the traffic check. Id. at 28, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 687-88. Accord
Testa v. Winquist, 451 F. Supp. 388, 392 (D. R.I. 1978).
15. Whitely, 401 U.S. at 568-69.
1982]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
Where a defendant moves to suppress evidence seized incident to an
arrest based on inaccurate computer information, the court should
consider two issues, both emanating from Whitely, in deciding
whether to grant the motion: first, whether the arresting officer acted
reasonably pursuant to the information; and second, whether the
agency that disseminated the information acted unreasonably in al-
lowing the information to become inaccurate."6 If both the arresting
officer and the agency that sent the inaccurate information have acted
reasonably, probable cause existed and the arrest should be upheld
despite the inaccuracy.17  The fourth amendment allows room for
police mistakes, as long as they are errors "of reasonable men, acting
on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability."' 8 In
addition, the fourth amendment does not require a standard of cer-
tainty,'" but requires that a source of -information be reliable.2 0
Finally, to invalidate an arrest solely because information relied upon
in making the arrest later proves to be inaccurate, without a showing
of unreasonableness on the part of the law enforcement agencies
involved with the arrest, does not advance the deterrent purpose of
the exclusionary rule. 21
A. Police Officer Reliance
An arrest made pursuant to inaccurate computer information
should not be invalidated on account of the actions of the arresting
officer, unless the officer acted unreasonably in relying on the infor-
mation. Probable cause must be measured by the facts known by the
officer at the time of the arrest, without inquiry as to facts later
discovered. 2 2 A subsequent discovery that computer information re-
lied upon in making an arrest was inaccurate at the time of the arrest
16. See People v. Jones, 110 Misc. 2d 875, 443 N.Y.S.2d 298 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1981) (arrest invalidated where both the arresting officer and sending agency acted
unreasonably), notes 25-28, 39-42 infra and accompanying text.
17. See Childress v. United States, 381 A.2d 614, 617 (D.C. 1977) (arrest was
upheld where arresting officer acted reasonably and the NCIC information was only
four days out of date), notes 47, 48 infra.
18. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1948).
19. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1971).
20. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1963).
21. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). "The [exclusionary]
rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of
the party aggrieved." Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Childress v. United States, 381
A.2d 614, 617 (D.C. 1977).
22. See People v. Honore, 2 Cal. App. 3d 295, 300, 82 Cal. Rptr. 639, 642
(1969); Patterson v. United States, 301 A.2d 67, 69 (D.C. 1973); Commonwealth v.
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does not render unreasonable the actions of the police officer at the
time he relied on the information.
In addition, the Whitely "fellow officer" rule permits a police
officer to rely on information supplied to him through an official
communication. 23  This rule has been extended to communications
using NCIC information and, therefore, the NCIC is a reliable source
for purposes of the fourth amendment, when such information is
supported by other facts and circumstances. 24
A police officer cannot, however, unreasonably rely on computer
information. In People v. Jones,25 the defendant was arrested after
officers received an "alarm" from their mobile field computer that the
vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger had been reported as
stolen. A search incident to the arrest revealed drugs, but the alarm
later proved to be erroneous. At the trial on the drug charge, the
arresting officer testified that, in his experience, almost 20 % of all
alarms turned out to be erroneous. 26 The court found this inaccuracy
rate to be "unquestionably substantial" and unreasonable. 27 There-
fore, the arrest was struck down because probable cause was not
found to have existed at the time of the arrest. 28  Where the officer's
prior experiences with computer information should lead him to be-
lieve that the computer source is not reliable and the officer does not
make further inquiry as to the accuracy of the report, an arrest based
on inaccurate computer information must be invalidated. 29 In addi-
tion, the courts should determine whether the arresting officer com-
plied with the NCIC policy regarding verification. 30
Riley, 425 A.2d 813, 816 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981). See also Michigan v. DeFillipo, 443
U.S. 31, 37 (1979) (the fact that the statute under which the police officer made an
arrest in good faith reliance was later ruled to be unconstitutional did not vitiate the
probable cause that existed at the time of the arrest).
23. Whitely, 401 U.S. at 568.
24. See United States v. Davis, 568 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir. 1978) (an NCIC
identification of a vehicle is sufficient to establish probable cause for the arrest of the
one in possession of the vehicle); Daniels v. State, 276 So. 2d 441, 446-47 (Ala. 1973)
(the fact that police had a report from the NCIC that a vehicle was stolen supplied
probable cause to arrest the driver).
25. 110 Misc. 2d 875, 443 N.Y.S.2d 298 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1981).
26. Id. at 876, N.Y.S.2d at 299.
27. Id. at 884, N.Y.S.2d at 304.
28. Cf. Patterson v. United States, 301 A.2d 67, 69 (D.C. 1973) (arresting officer
testified that he had never known the police teletype to be wrong and, therefore,
arrest based on inaccurate NCIC information transmitted over the teletype was
upheld).
29. See 110 Misc. 2d at 884 n.4, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 304 n.4 (1981).
30. See notes 59-65 infra and accompanying text.
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B. Sending Agency Action
If a court determines that an arresting officer has reasonably relied
on inaccurate computer information, it also must evaluate the actions
of the agency that furnished the information, and invalidate the arrest
if the agency did not have probable cause to send the information. 31
This result is dictated by Whitely v. Warden, which extends the
fourth amendment probable cause requirement to all police agencies
involved with the arrest .32
In People v. Decuir,33 the defendant was arrested by a police officer
who had been furnished with NCIC information that there was a
warrant outstanding for the defendant's arrest. The NCIC informa-
tion, in fact, had been inaccurate for two months. 34  The court
granted the defendant's motion to suppress evidence on a narcotics
charge stemming from a search incident to the arrest. 35  Following
Whitely, the court held that although the arresting officer acted
reasonably, the arrest was invalid because there was no probable
cause independent of the invalid warrant. 3  The Decuir result is
correct in that the two month failure to cancel the NCIC information
concerning the outdated warrant was unreasonable action on the part
of the sending agency and could not be used to furnish probable cause.
The Decuir court did not, however, base its decision on the unreason-
able delay in cancellation, but instead interpreted Whitely as meaning
that the fact that the warrant was no longer valid alone vitiated
probable cause. While this interpretation is technically correct, such a
strict interpretation is unnecessary because the fourth amendment
requires a standard of reasonableness, not certainty.3 7 If certainty
were required, any delay by a police agency in updating its computer
records would be unreasonable and would result in the invalidation of
an arrest made in reliance on the records.38
31. See People v. Decuir, 84 Ill. App. 3d 531, 532-33, 405 N.E.2d 891, 893
(1980).
32. See generally W. LA FAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.5, at 623-24 (1978).
33. 84 Ill. App. 3d, 531, 405 N.E.2d 891 (1980).
34. Id. at 532, 405 N.E.2d at 892.
35. Id. at 533, 405 N.E.2d at 893.
36. Id. Accord People v. Lemmons, 49 A.D. 2d 639, 640, 370 N.Y.S.2d 243, 244-
45 (3d Dep't 1975) (mem.), aff'd on other grounds, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97,
354 N.E.2d 836 (1976).
37. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
38. In some situations, the delay could be unavoidable, and not unreasonable.
For example, a stolen car entered in the NCIC as stolen might be recovered on a
weekend, in which case there could be a delay in cancellation of the entry until the
beginning of the workweek, or an NCIC user terminal may be temporarily out of
service.
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The issue of delay in updating computer information was addressed
by the court in People v. Jones,39 where a three month failure on the
part of the sending agency to correct computer information was held
to be grounds for invalidating an arrest made in reliance on the
information. 40 The court recognized, however, that "some delay is to
be expected" in correcting or updating computer records and placed
the burden of establishing that the delay is reasonable on the sending
agency.
41
The Jones decision correctly interpreted Whitely because it would
allow an arrest based on inaccurate computer information to be up-
held where the purpose of the exclusionary rule is not advanced by the
suppression of evidence seized incident to the arrest. Under Jones, the
sending agency must show that it did not act unreasonably in dissemi-
nating the inaccurate information. 42  Conversely, under Decuir, the
actions of the sending agency are irrelevant because the mere fact that
the computer information underlying the arrest was inaccurate would
invalidate the arrest. 43  The Decuir rationale emphasizes form over
substance where the inaccuracy is not the fault of the police. The
Jones rationale, however, allows room for a "good faith" exception to
the exclusionary rule.44 Rather than requiring the invalidation of an
arrest solely because the information relied on in making the arrest
later proves to be inaccurate, Whitely should require that courts
examine the actions of the agency to determine whether it acted
unreasonably in allowing the information to become inaccurate.
39. 110 Misc. 2d 875, 443 N.Y.S.2d 298 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1981).
40. Id. at 884, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 304. The defendant had been the passenger in a
car that was stopped by officers who had entered the car's license tag number into
their mobile field computer and received an "alarm" that the vehicle had been
reported as stolen. One of the officers radioed the police dispatcher and received
confirmation that the vehicle was wanted. The officers stopped the vehicle in ques-
tion and advised that driver that she was under arrest for possession of a stolen
vehicle. The driver told the officer that the car was not stolen, but was borrowed.
The officer called the dispatcher again and was again told that the car was reported
as stolen. The driver and the other passengers were arrested. Controlled substances
were subsequently seized from one of the passengers. The occupants of the car were
then taken to the precinct station, where it was ascertained that although the vehicle
had been stolen three months earlier, it had been recovered three days later and
returned to its owner, and that the driver was using the car with the owner's
permission. The driver was then released; her companions, however, including the
defendant, were charged with drug offenses. Id. at 876-77, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 299-300.
41. Id. at 884, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
42. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
43. See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
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The length of the delay in failing to update inaccurate computer
information has been the determinative factor of several cases involv-
ing arrests based on inaccurate computer information. In Patterson v.
United States,45 for example, an arrest based on NCIC information
was upheld despite the fact that "for some unexplained reason" the
information had been inaccurate for fifteen hours prior to the ar-
rest. 46  Similarly, in Childress v. United States,47 the failure on the
part of police to cancel information regarding warrants that the de-
fendant had satisfied four days prior to the arrest was held to be a
reasonable administrative delay.48
45. 301 A.2d 67 (D.C. 1973).
46. Id. at 69. The defendant had been stopped after police officers had noticed
that the license tags on the vehicle he was driving were on their "stolen list". One of
the officers radioed for an NCIC check, and the dispatcher replied that the vehicle
was still wanted. In fact, the vehicle had been recovered some fifteen hours before
the arrest, but the NCIC entry had not yet been cancelled. Relying on the inaccurate
NCIC information, the officers arrested the defendant. The vehicle was searched and
a loaded revolver was discovered. At some point, the defendant was cleared of
suspicion of auto theft by establishing to the satisfaction of the officers that he was
driving the vehicle with the owner's authorization, but he was charged with the
weapons offenses. Id. at 68-69.
47. 381 A.2d 614 (D.C. 1977).
48. Id. at 617. Police officers observed the defendant acting in what the officers
considered to be a suspicious manner. The officers watched the defendant get into an
automobile, whereupon one of the officers radioed for a check on the tag numbers.
The dispatcher responded that there were four traffic warrants outstanding for the
defendant. The defendant actually had posted collateral for the warrants four days
earlier, but the warrants had not been removed from the computerized list. Later, in
reliance on the inaccurate computer information, police officers stopped the car and
ordered the defendant to get out. The officers observed burglary tools and stolen
property inside the car in plain view. Advising the defendant that he was being
stopped because of the outstanding warrants, the police requested and received his
permission to open the trunk, wherein they found more stolen property. The defend-
ant was arrested and charged with petty larceny and destruction of property. Id. at
616. The court held that reasonable police reliance on misinformation produced by a
reasonable delay "presents a situation in which [granting the defendant's motion to
suppress] would do nothing to advance the purposes of the exclusionary rule." Id. at
617. See also Commonwealth v. Riley, 425 A.2d 813 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (arrest
based on NCIC information four days out of date was upheld); State v. Cross, 164
N.J. Super. 368, 396 A.2d 604 (App. Div. 1978). In Cross, the defendant was stopped
by a state trooper for a speeding violation. The trooper radioed for an investigative
check on the registration through the NCIC, and was informed that the vehicle was
entered as stolen by the Camden Police Department. On the basis of this informa-
tion, the defendant was arrested for possession of a stolen vehicle. The defendant
insisted that he owned the vehicle and had reported it as stolen, but that it had since
been returned to him. The trooper arrested the defendant after searching the glove
compartment and finding drugs. Upon returning to the police station the trooper
telephoned the Camden police to check the status of the vehicle, and he was in-
formed that the defendant's assertions were correct. The Camden police admitted
that "they forgot to cancel their teletype in the NCIC computer." At trial on the drug
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An arrest based on computer information five months out of date
was struck down in United States v. Mackey. 49  The court recognized
the fourth amendment basis for the defendant's claim, but decided the
case on due process grounds.50  It held that the five month failure to
cancel the information amounted to a "capricious disregard" of the
defendant's due process rights, 5' in that the defendant was a "marked
man" for five months prior to his arrest and had been subject to an
unwarranted arrest at any time.5 2 The court in Mackey may have
been attempting to extend the broader range of protections afforded
by due process to individuals arrested in the future pursuant to inaccu-
rate computer information.5 3 While the elasticity of due process is
beneficial to the extent that it protects a defendant who has suffered
an injustice not clearly definable under a specific provision of the
United States Constitution, courts are not expected to formulate a rule
of constitutional law broader than is necessary to fit the facts of the
case. 54
charge, the trooper testified that he believed the Camden police informed him that
the vehicle had been reported as stolen five weeks before. Id. at 369-71, 396 A.2d at
604-05. The court held that the information supplied to the officers gave rise to
probable cause to arrest, and that the search was valid as incident to a valid arrest.
Id. at 372-73, 396 A.2d at 606. The Cross decision is questionable, in that the actions
of both the arresting officer and the sending agency appear to have been unreasona-
ble. The officer acted unreasonably in searching the defendant before receiving
verification on the information, even while the defendant was insisting that it was
incorrect. The admission by the sending agency that it had forgotten to cancel the
NCIC information is a clear indication of unreasonableness, although the five week
failure to cancel the information, by itself, should have been enough to vitiate
probable cause.
49. 387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975). The defendant was stopped and ques-
tioned by police who saw him unlawfully hitchhiking. He was arrested after the
police radioed his name to their dispatcher and were informed that the computer
showed a warrant outstanding for his arrest. Despite assertions by the defendant that
the warrant was no longer valid, he was searched and an unregistered shotgun was
found in his possession. Sometime afterward, the police received information that the
defendant had complied with the warrant five months earlier. Nonetheless, the
defendant was charged with the weapons offense. Id. at 1121.
50. Id. at 1125 n.9.
51. Id. at 1125.
52. Id. at 1124.
53. Unlike the fourth amendment, which sets a definite standard of reasonable-
ness, due process "is far from mathematically precise: since due process is not a
mechanical yardstick, it does not afford mechanical answers." B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 7.2, at 238 (2d ed. 1979). The Supreme Court has held that due
process requires a standard of "fairness," Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113
(1977), and has stated that due process means that "convictions cannot be brought
about by methods that offend a sense of justice." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
173 (1952).
54. Liverpool, N.Y. & Phil. S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S.
33, 39 (1885).
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Under the facts of Mackey, the defendant was afforded ample
protection by the fourth amendment. The arrest should have been
invalidated because the five month failure to cancel the information
was unreasonable. 55 A due process analysis permits courts to apply a
less specific standard than reasonableness and could discourage the use
of computers as a law enforcement tool. Due process should not be
utilized unless it appears that the fourth amendment does not ade-
quately protect the public against false arrest pursuant to inaccurate
computer information. The fact that subsequent cases involving arrest
based on inaccurate computer information did not adopt the Mackey
due process rationale, but instead used the fourth amendment, indi-
cates that the courts have found the fourth amendment to afford
adequate protection.5
The extent of the delay in updating computer information provides
courts with an indicium of whether the sending agency acted reasona-
bly. Where the delay is lengthy, for example, two months in Decuir,
or five months in Mackey, the arrest should be invalidated without
further inquiry. In cases where the delay is not manifestly unreasona-
ble, courts should examine whether NCIC policies and procedures 57
have been followed in order to determine whether probable cause
standards have been met.58  Where the sending agency does not ad-
here to these policies and procedures, the arrest should be invalidated
as violative of the fourth amendment.
55. See People v. Decuir, 84 Ill. App. 3d 531, 532-33, 405 N.E.2d 891, 892-93
(1980) (invalidating an arrest based on NCIC information two months out of date)
People v. Jones, 110 Misc. 2d 875, 884, 443 N.Y.S.2d 298, 304 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1981)
(invalidating an arrest based on computer information three months out of date).
56. See note 8 supra.
57. See Section III infra. The NCIC policies and procedures would not be
applicable where the inaccurate information has not been entered into the NCIC,
but is contained within the state system. Information cannot be entered into the
NCIC by a user agency unless that agency is willing to extradite the individual.
NCIC Operating Manual § 4.2.2, at Intro-63 (Nov. 1, 1981). The information,
however, could be used within the state system. Although the NCIC policies and
procedures would not apply, the fourth amendment issue would still be present.
NCIC policy is recommended by the NCIC Advisory Policy Board, which is com-
posed of 20 elected representatives from criminal justice agencies throughout the
United States, and six members who are appointed by the Director of the FBI. Id. §
1.5, at Intro-5 (Aug. 1, 1979).
58. But see United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), which upheld the
introduction into evidence of a tape recording made by an IRS agent, who had not
obtained the proper authorizations required under IRS regulations for monitoring
suspects, at the respondent's trial for bribery of an IRS agent. Id. at 743-44. The
Court held that the IRS "was not required by the Constitution or by statute to adopt
any particular procedures or rules before engaging in consensual monitoring and
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III. judicial Notice of NCIC Operating Policies and Procedures
NCIC operating policies and procedures relate to the actions of
both the arresting officer and the sending agency. The courts should
take judicial notice of these safeguards and base their decision of
whether probable cause existed on the degree of compliance with
them.
For purposes of providing individuals with adequate protection
under the fourth amendment, the most important policy is one
whereby an NCIC "hit" (an inquiry receiving an affirmative re-
sponse) -9 alone, does not furnish probable cause to arrest.60 The hit is
only one factor which the officer must consider in conjunction with
other circumstances before taking action. 61 The inquiring agency
must communicate immediately with the originating agency to verify
the accuracy of the hit. 12  This policy, known as "the ten minute
rule,"6' 3 requires the originating agency to, within ten minutes of the
communication, either confirm the accuracy of the hit, inform the
inquiring agency that the record is no longer accurate, or give notice
of the specific amount of time necessary to confirm or reject.6 4
The importance of the ten minute rule is that the NCIC has recog-
nized the fourth amendment problems inherent in using computer
information as an investigative tool and requires its user agencies to
ensure that the information being relied on in making the arrest is
accurate. According to this rule, an arresting officer can never assume
NCIC information to be accurate until it is verified. Where the arrest-
ing officer does not make an immediate attempt to verify, probable
cause has not been established and the arrest should be invalidated.
recording." Id. at 749. In the context of arrest, however, police are required by the
fourth amendment to act reasonably, and it seems that Caceres can be distinguished
from the computer cases on that ground.
59. For example, an individual is stopped by a police officer affiliated with an
NCIC user department. The officer calls his dispatcher and gives the individual's
name, or the vehicle identification number (VIN) of the vehicle he is driving. The
department would then check the individual's name, or the VIN, through the NCIC.
If the NCIC computer listed the individual as wanted, or the vehicle as reported
stolen, the department would be informed of the "hit" through its terminal.
60. NCIC Operating Manual § 1.2, at Intro-2 (Nov. 1, 1979).
61. Id.
62. Id. § 1.7, at Intro-7a (Nov. 1, 1981).
63. Telephone conversation with Jeremiah J. Smith, Assistant Section Chief,
NCIC (Jan. 7, 1982).
64. NCIC Operating Manual § 1.7, at Intro-7a (Nov. 1, 1981).
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The NCIC is a voluntary system and a user agency need not make
an entry into the system.6 5 Once an agency enters a record into the
NCIC, however, it is responsible for the accuracy, timeliness and
completeness of the record.66 The NCIC requires an agency acting on
the basis of a record in the system to immediately enter a "locate" into
the system to signify to the originating agency that the record acted
upon is no longer needed in the system.67 As soon as the locate is
placed, the originating agency is required to cancel the record from
the system. If it does not comply, the NCIC computer will remove the
record five days later in the case of individuals, or ten days later in the
case of stolen vehicles and property."' The courts should examine
whether this procedure has been complied with in conjunction with
the Whitely requirement that the law enforcement system as a whole
adhere to the fourth amendment.69 The failure to enter or respond to
a locate should be treated as prima facie evidence of unreasonable
conduct, even if the period between when the information should
have been removed and the time of the arrest is brief.
Although the FBI does not assume responsibility for any NCIC
records other than those which it enters into the system, 70 as manager
of the system, the FBI attempts to ensure accuracy through several
65. An entry is a message placing a new record in an NCIC file by a user agency.
NCIC Operating Manual § 2.2.1, at Intro-8. An agency might withhold information
from the NCIC "because of criminal justice priorities, budgetary limitations, or other
reasons determined to be legitimate by the state control terminal agency." Id. § 1.6,
at Intro-6 (Nov. 1, 1981). User agencies cannot enter information about a wanted
person into the NCIC unless the state is willing to extradite the individual. Id. §
4.2.2, at Intro-63 (Nov. 1, 1981).
66. NCIC Operating Manual § 1.3, at Intro-3 (May 1, 1981). In Testa v. Win-
quist, 451 F. Supp. 388 (D. R.I. 1978), plaintiffs sued police officers who had
arrested them after receiving NCIC information that erroneously listed a vehicle in
the possession of the arrestees as stolen. The court held that the plaintiffs could state a
cause of action if they could show that the arresting officers unreasonably relied on
the NCIC information and on the sending officer's confirmation, and that the
administrator of the issuing NCIC agency had a duty to minimize the risk of false
arrest by requiring that the records be constantly updated. Id. at 390-94.
67. Telephone conversation with David Nemecek, Section Chief, NCIC (Jan. 14,
1982).
68. Id.
69. See Section II, B. supra.
70. NCIC Operating Manual § 1.7, at Intro-7 (Nov. 1, 1981). But see United
States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121, 1123-24 (D. Nev. 1975) (stating in dicta that
the FBI has some duty to ensure that NCIC information is accurate). Accord Testa v.
Winquist, 451 F. Supp. 388, 395 (D. R.I. 1978). Although it is the responsibility of
the individual NCIC agencies to ensure the accuracy of the records they enter into
the system, the FBI should bear the ultimate burden of ensuring that the NCIC is a
sufficiently reliable source for purposes of the fourth amendment. The large number
of NCIC agencies necessitates that a single entity maintain discipline within the
system.
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procedures. 71 These include: quality control checks; 72 automatic re-
moval of records after they are on file for a prescribed period of
time;73 and the periodic furnishing of lists of all records on file for
validation by the agencies that entered them.74  Compliance with
these procedures also should be examined by the courts in determining
whether the conduct of the sending agency is reasonable.
IV. Conclusion
Where a criminal charge stems from a search incident to an arrest
based on inaccurate computer information and the defendant moves
to suppress the evidence seized on the ground that the fourth amend-
ment standard of probable cause was not met, the court must address
two issues: first, whether the arresting officer acted reasonably pursu-
ant to the information; and second, whether the agency that dissemi-
nated the information acted unreasonably in allowing the information
to become inaccurate. If either the arresting officer or the sending
agency acted unreasonably, the arrest should be struck down as not
having satisfied the probable cause requirement of the fourth amend-
ment. Where both have acted reasonably, however, the arrest should
be upheld despite any inaccuracy. The fourth amendment requires
adherence to standards of reasonableness and reliability, not cer-
tainty. The deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is not advanced
where an arrest is invalidated in the absence of unreasonable police
conduct.
71. NCIC Operating Manual § 1.3, at Intro-3 (May 1, 1981).
72. The FBI NCIC personnel periodically check records entered into the system
for accuracy. Id. § 4.2.1, at Intro-62 (Nov. 1, 1980). If a check reveals an apparently
erroneous record, the NCIC will advise the control terminal agency and the originat-
ing agency (the agency that entered the record into the system) of the record and
request that it be verified, changed, or cancelled within 24 hours. If neither a
response is received nor corrective action is taken during that time period, the NCIC
is supposed to cancel the record. Id. § 4.2.3, at Intro-64 (Nov. 1, 1981).
73. The FBI periodically "purges" the computer files. Unrecovered stolen vehicle
records generally remain on file for four years before they are removed. Records
concerning unrecovered vehicles wanted in conjunction with a felony remain on file
for 90 days after entry; if a longer period is desired, the vehicle must be re-entered.
Records concerning wanted persons remain on file indefinitely until action is taken
by the originating agency to clear the record. 46 Fed. Reg. 22499 (1981).
74. The NCIC periodically prepares listings of records on file, and mails them to
the appropriate control terminals who in turn disseminate the records to the originat-
ing agency. The Vehicle and Wanted Person files are sent out for validation twice
yearly. NCIC Operating Manual § 4.3.1, at Intro-65 (Nov. 1, 1981). The control
terminal must certify to the NCIC that all records under its service jurisdiction are
accurate. If a control terminal agency fails to certify any validation listing to the
NCIC within 75 days, the NCIC is supposed to purge all of that state's unvalidated
records. Id. § 4.3.2, at Intro-66 (Nov. 1, 1980).
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To aid in the determination of whether the police agencies involved
in an arrest based on inaccurate NCIC information satisfied probable
cause, the courts should take judicial notice of NCIC policies and
procedures. At a minimum, the courts should mandate that present
NCIC safeguards be followed by NCIC user agencies.
Patrick Hand
